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A New Twist on an Old Approach:
Missouri's Use of Unconscionability
and Consent in the Class Arbitration
Waiver Analysis
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the inclusion of arbitration agreements in consumer product
contracts has become increasingly popular. In an effort to shield themselves from
the damaging effects of expensive class action suits by consumers, many compa-
nies have begun to include class arbitration waivers in their contracts, which ef-
fectively mandate individual arbitration.2 These arbitration agreements were in-
itially met with optimism.3 However, courts have seemingly developed a sense of
disdain toward them because of their apparent ability to perpetuate disreputable
business practices. This has left many courts searching for ways to invalidate
class arbitration waivers.
Brewer represents a new twist on an old approach. While the contract de-
fense of unconscionability has been widely used in the battle against class arbitra-
tion waivers, the Brewer court chose to adopt a new framework for the unconscio-
nability analysis.4 Furthermore, in light of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
concerning the contract defense of consent, the Supreme Court of Missouri also
opted to depart from Missouri's typical treatment of arbitration agreements con-
taining class arbitration waivers.5 This note will examine the new foundation that
has been laid for the class arbitration waiver analysis and the policy arguments
surrounding it.
1. 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. 2010).
2. See Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack? Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism
of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 477, 478-79 (2009) ("In order to streamline the arbitration process and
alleviate the burden of costly consumer class actions suits, manufacturers and service providers have
started to require that consumers waive the right to proceed in court or in arbitration on a class-wide
basis."); see also Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
75,75-76 (2004).
3. Lampley, supra note 2, at 479; see also Woods v. CQ Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90,98 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2008) ("Individualizing each claim absolutely and completely insulates and immunizes
Appellant from scrutiny and accountability for its business practices and also serves as a disincentive
for Appellant to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in the first place.")
(footnote and internal quotations omitted), abrogated in part by Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18.
4. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 21-22.
5. Id. at 20-21.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
As a title lender, Missouri Title Loans, Inc. offers small, short-term loans to
borrowers, which are secured by the title of the borrower's car.6 The company
operates roughly fifty branches in the state of Missouri and has done business with
nearly 15,000 Missourians since 2001 . Plaintiff, Beverly Brewer, received a
$2,215 loan from Missouri Title Loans, which was secured by the title to her 2003
Buick Rendezvous. 8 The annual percentage rate for Brewer's thirty-day loan was
roughly 300 percent, which translated to $564.37 in finance charges.9 In order to
obtain this loan, Brewer signed a loan agreement, promissory note, and a security
agreement.' 0 The loan agreement contained a clause that required arbitration of
any disputes and a waiver of Brewer's right to class arbitration, which effectively
mandated individual arbitration of all claims."
Brewer filed a class action petition against Missouri Title Loans (MTL), al-
leging violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA)12 and
several other statutes.13 Based on the arbitration clause in the loan agreement,
MTL filed a motion to dismiss Brewer's claims and to compel her to arbitrate the
claims individually.' 4 The trial court found the class arbitration waiver to be un-
conscionable and unenforceable.' 5 Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment
partially granting MTL's motion and ordering the issue to continue to arbitration
to determine whether it was a suitable matter for class arbitration. MTL ap-
pealed, arguing three main points.' 7 First, MTL asserted that the arbitration clause
was not unconscionable because Brewer was not forced to obtain the loan from
MTL.'8 Second, it maintained that the trial court's decision was preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' 9 Finally, MTL argued that the class arbitration
agreement acted as an exculpatory clause because it was clear and unambiguous,
and because it does not give MTL any surprise advantage. 20
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed the holding
of the trial court, finding the class arbitration waiver unconscionable and noting
6. Missouri Title Loan, Inc., v. City of St. Louis Bd. of Adjustment, 62 S.W.3d 408,411 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2001).
7. Substitute Brief of Plaintiff-Rcspondent at *16, Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323
S.W.3d 18 (Mo. 2010) (No. SC 90647), 2010 WL 1604559.
8. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 20.
9. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loan, Inc., No. ED92569, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 1714, at *1 (Mo.
App. E.D 2009).
10. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 20.
11. Id.
12. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), enacted in 1976, was designed to supple-
ment the common law action for fraud in an effort to further protect consumers from fraudulent busi-
ness practices. Missouri v. Cont'1 Scrvs. Inc., 84 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); see also
MMPA, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010-407.1129 (2008).




17. Brewer, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 1714.
18. Id. at *4.
19. Id. at *10; see also Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
20. Brewer, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 1714, at *10.
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that there was evidence of both substantive and procedural unconscionability.2 1
However, the court let the remainder of the arbitration agreement stand.22 With
regard to MTL's second point, the appeals court held that the action was not
preempted by the FAA because Missouri law clearly allows arbitration agree-
ments to be invalidated using state law contract defenses, such as unconscionabili-
ty.23 Finally, the appeals court held that the arbitration agreement did not act as a
valid exculpatory clause, because the company could not be allowed to use the
arbitration agreement to immunize itself from liability.24 MTL appealed to the
Supreme Court of Missouri on August 31, 2010, and the court affirmed the hold-
ings of the lower court, with one exception.25
The court not only held that the class arbitration waiver was invalid, due to its
unconscionable aspects, but that the entire arbitration agreement was invalid be-
cause Missouri Title Loans could not be forced into class arbitration without prior
consent.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
According to Section 2 of the FAA, a written arbitration agreement shall be
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."26 While the courts are generally in
favor of arbitration provisions, such provisions can be invalidated using state law
contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 27 This section will
focus on the interplay between the FAA and state law contract defenses, specifi-
cally unconscionability and consent.
A. Determination of Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability is perhaps the most widely used basis for
challenging the enforceability of arbitration provisions.28 In Missouri, the general
concept of unconscionability has been defined as an injustice "so strong, gross,
and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with common sense with-
out producing an exclamation at the inequality of it."29 From the outset, it is im-
perative to note that there are two types of unconscionability: procedural and
substantive.3 0  Procedural unconscionability refers to the initial formation of a
21. Id. at *3-*10.
22. Id. at *-*I12.
23. Id. at *10.
24. Id. at *11.
25. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 24,
26. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
27. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 686-87 (1996).
28. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 83 (2008); see also Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-
Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 260 (2006) ("[Tihe arbitration wars have brought unconscionability back to
center stage.").
29. McMullin v. McMullin, 926 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) (citations and quotations
omitted).
30. Whitney v. Alltel Conunc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005), abrogated in
part by Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18.
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contract, and considers factors such as the relative bargaining power of the parties,
fine print, misrepresentations, and high pressure exerted on the parties. 3' Substan-
tive unconscionability, on the other hand, refers to any excessive harshness in the
actual contract terms themselves. 32 Most states require a showing of both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability in order to invalidate a contractual provi-
sion. 3 Until very recently, Missouri followed this approach.
Missouri's use of this two-pronged unconscionability analysis began three
decades ago with Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie International,
Inc. 3 "King Louie" owned a radio station and entered into an agreement with
Funding Systems to lease station equipment. Among other things, the agreement
stated that defective equipment would not relieve King Louie of its duty under the
lease.36 After a third-party purchaser took over the lease from King Louie and
refused to pay for malfunctioning equipment, Funding Systems brought suit and
King Louie challenged the provision. Although the court noted that, in general,
both types of unconscionability must be present to invalidate a contract provision,
it suggested that these concepts operate on a "sliding scale."38 Thus, if significant
substantive unconscionability is present, less evidence of procedural unconsciona-
bility is needed to strike a contract provision and vice versa. However, after
finding that the plaintiff could not demonstrate any amount of procedural uncons-
cionability, the court held that the contract provision at issue was not unconscion-
able." Missouri courts interpreted this holding to require a showing of both types
of unconscionability. 41
Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc. typifies Missouri's past treatment of
unconscionability. 42 Jerry Whitney had been a customer of Alltel, a wireless tele-
phone provider, since 1995.43 Whitney filed a class action suit after Alltel in-
cluded a small charge on his billing statements, claiming it was a mandatory tax."
Relying on an arbitration agreement and class arbitration waiver contained in the
new "Terms and Conditions" that were included with Whitney's August statement
in 2000, Alltel filed a motion to compel individual arbitration. 45 These new terms
31. Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo. App. W.D.
1979).
32. Id.
33. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1278 (2003); Christopher B. McKinney, Note, "Low- Value" & "Predictably
Small": When Should Class-Arbitration Waivers Be Invalidated as Unconscionable, 2007 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 579, 583 (2007).
34. 597 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979).
35. Id at 627.
36. Id. at 628.
37. Id
38. Id. at 634.
39. Id.
40. Funding Sys., 597 S.W.2d at 635-36.
41. See Repair Masters Constr. Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Shaffcr v.
Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Kansas City Urology v. United
Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 15-16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008); Woods v. QC Fin. Scrys., Inc., 280
S.W.3d 90,95 (Mo. App, E.D. 2008).
42. 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005), abrogated in part by Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18.
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altered the original contract and stated that a customer's continued use of Alltel's
services would constitute an acceptance.46
Citing Funding Systems, the Whitney court determined that both types of
unconscionability must be present to find a provision invalid.47 The court found
procedural unconscionably as the new terms were presented in a "take it or leave
it" fashion, 48 Alltel was in a superior bargaining position, there was no negotia-
tion, and the provision was in fine print on the back of a bill that Whitney was
unlikely to see.49 Substantive unconscionability also existed, as the claim was
small and would be economically infeasible to prosecute individually.50 Whitney
would be required to bear all the costs of arbitration, with his potential recovery
being minimal, effectively depriving him of a remedy.5' After finding evidence of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the court held that the arbitra-
tion agreement was invalid.
Vincent v. Schneider was the first case to cast doubt on the two-pronged un-
conscionability analysis that had been so prevalent in Missouri in the past.53 In
Vincent, the plaintiffs purchased homes from the defendant and signed a contract
that mandated arbitration at the seller's discretion, allowed the seller to choose the
venue and the arbitrator, and forced the plaintiffs to bear the costs.M After the
plaintiffs brought suit, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration." The
court found the provision to be substantively unconscionable because the defen-
dant wanted the ability to select arbitration, select the actual arbitrator, and then
force the plaintiffs to pay for it.56 The court held that these three provisions of the
arbitration agreement were impermissibly unconscionable, but that the rest of the
agreement was enforceable. Notably, however, the court attacked the terms of
the agreement itself, but it never attacked the circumstances under which the con-
tract was made, which is the hallmark of procedural unconscionability.
B. Severability of Unconscionable Provisions
After finding a provision unconscionable, the court must then determine how
it will treat that provision in the context of the rest of the contract. Under Mis-
souri law, if the court finds a contract provision unconscionable at the time it was
made, it may refuse to enforce the contract altogether, sever the unconscionable
provision and enforce the remainder of the contract, or enforce the entire contract
46. Id.
47. Id. at 308.
48. See Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1137 n. 16 (1 ith Cir. 2010) (stating a
"take it or leave it" basis generally refers to circumstances where a consumer has no opportunity to
negotiate and cannot obtain the desired product without consenting to the terms of the contract) (cita-
tions and internal quotations omitted).
49. Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 308-09.
50. Id. at 309.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006).
54. Id. at 855-56.
55. Id. at 856.
56. Id. at 860-61.
57. Id. at 861.
No. 1] 213
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but limit the application of the unconscionable portion.58 The lower court's deci-
sion in Brewer to sever only the unconscionable class action waiver, but to let the
rest of the arbitration agreement stand, was fairly typical of Missouri courts' be-
havior towards such provisions.
In Swain v. Auto Services, Inc., a Missouri resident challenged an arbitration
agreement with Auto Services, which was included in an auto service plan he had
obtained from them after they refused to pay for repairs to his car.59 The agree-
ment provided, among other things, that the venue for arbitration would be in
ArkansasW The court found this provision invalid because part of the unconscio-
nability analysis involved determining what a reasonable party could have ex-
pected and Swain, as a Missouri resident, could not have expected his dispute to
be resolved in another state.6' The court noted that if an invalid provision is not
essential to the entire agreement, the rest of the agreement may stand.62 Further-
more, the determination of whether a provision is essential involves the intent of
the parities. The court held that the venue provision was not essential because
arbitration could occur anywhere without affecting the rest of the agreement, so
the remainder of the arbitration agreement could be enforced without it." The
court.further stated that invalidating the entire arbitration agreement would under-
cut the liberal federal policy in favor of such agreements.65
Woods v. QC Financial Services66 is also informative because it is even more
similar to Brewer. In Woods, the plaintiff challenged a mandatory arbitration
agreement and class arbitration waiver that was included in the terms of a contract
with the defendant, a payday lender.67 The court found procedural unconsciona-
bility because the terms were offered on a take it or leave it basis, the agreement
was in fine print, and the defendant admitted that it had never negotiated with any
of its 400,000 customers." Furthermore, the court determined that the defendant
was clearly in a superior bargaining position.69 It was a national company that did
business with people who need money so badly that they were willing to borrow
against their next paycheck at interest rates of at least 400 percent.70 The court
also found the presence of substantive unconscionability because the size of the
claim was so small that settling the issue on an individual basis was economically
impractical and unfeasible.7 1 Thus, by prohibiting class arbitration, the defendant
was effectively depriving its customers of a remedy. 72
58. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-302(1) (2008).
59. Swain v. Auto Scrvs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).
60. Id.




65. Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 108.
66. 280 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
67. Id at 92-93.
68. Id at 96.
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 97-98.
72. Id. at 98.
214 [Vol. 2011
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/12
A New Twist on an Old Approach
The defendant in Woods challenged the trial court's decision to sever only the
unconscionable class arbitration waiver.73 It argued that, because the arbitration
agreement required the defendant to pay all arbitration fees and because class
arbitration would be much more expensive, allowing the plaintiffs to force them
into class arbitration fundamentally altered the contract by imposing excessive
arbitration fees for which the defendant never intended to assume liability.74 The
court found that the defendant's argument was disingenuous because it simply did
not want to pay more to arbitrate its allegedly illegal practices." In doing so, it
upheld the trial court's decision to sever only the unconscionable class arbitration
waiver and allowed the remainder of the agreement to stand, which would essen-
tially allow Woods to compel the defendant into class arbitration.76
C. Consent- Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp."
Stolt-Nielsen and the contract doctrine of consent play an integral role in
Brewer. Stolt-Nielsen is a shipping company that charters compartments on its
vessels to customers such as AnimalFeeds.78 The standard contract between Stolt-
Nielsen and AnimalFeeds, known as a charter party, contained a mandatory arbi-
tration provision that was silent on the issue of class arbitration.79 After learning
of an alleged anti-trust violation, AnimalFeeds and several other charterers
brought suit against Stolt-Nielsen, and a judicial panel ordered consolidation of
the cases.80 In 2005, AnimalFeeds served Stolt-Nielsen with a demand for class
arbitration and the two parties agreed to submit the issue to an arbitration panel to
determine whether the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.8'
Taking into consideration the parties' stipulation that the arbitration clause
was silent on the issue of class arbitration, the arbitration panel concluded that
class arbitration was permitted because no evidence was introduced that the par-
ties intended to preclude it.82 The district court vacated the award, holding that
the arbitrators should have applied federal maritime law, which requires the con-
tract to be interpreted according to custom and usage.83 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed because Stolt-Nielsen cited no authority
supporting the claim that federal maritime usage and custom was against class
arbitration.84 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
imposing class arbitration is consistent with the FAA when the arbitration agree-
ment is silent on that issue.85
73. Id. at 99-100.
74. Id.
75. Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 100.
76. Id.
77. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
78. Id. at 1764.
79. Id. at 1765.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1764.
No. 1] 215
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The Court began its analysis by noting that, under the FAA, arbitration "is a
matter of consent, not coercion," and that the primary goal of the FAA is to en-
force arbitration agreements according to their terms.86 Given that the arbitrator
derives power only from the parties' consent to submit their claim to arbitration,
the intent and expectations of those parties control." With this in mind, the Court
determined that parties are free to structure arbitration agreements as they see fit,
and to enter into such agreements with whomever they see fit.88 Thus, a court
cannot force a party to arbitrate any issue, or with a party, which he did not agree
to. 89 Based on these principles, the Court held that, under the FAA, a party may
not be forced to submit to class arbitration without a contractual basis for deter-
mining that the parties agreed to do so."0
The Court recognized that the arbitration panel's decision rested on the fact
that the silent agreement did not preclude class arbitration and, therefore, it must
be acceptable.9' The Court found this logic to be "fundamentally at war with the
foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent" and held that
consent to class arbitration cannot be inferred simply from the act of submitting an
issue to arbitration because class arbitration fundamentally alters the agreement.92
Unlike individual arbitration, the indefinite multiplication of parties and issues
that accompany class arbitration could undermine not only the parties' expecta-
tions of costs, but also their ability to maintain privacy and confidentiality.93 This
becomes even more of an issue when one considers that arbitration purports to
bind even absent parties.9 Perhaps more burdensome to the parties is the fact
that, while the stakes are nearly as high as litigation, arbitration awards are subject
only to limited judicial review.95 Thus, because mere silence on the issue of class
arbitration cannot be equated with consent to these additional burdens, the Court
held that the parties could not be forced to submit to class arbitration.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In Brewer, the court began its analysis by noting that, while the FAA general-
ly requires all valid arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce to be
enforced, all or part of an invalid arbitration agreement may be invalidated using
86. Id at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989)); see also FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4 ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.") (cmphasis added).
87. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1775.
90. Id. at 1776.
91. Id. at 1775.
92. Id. (footnote omitted).
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state law contract defenses such as unconscionability, fraud, and duress.97 In or-
der to better understand the relationship between these contract defenses and the
FAA, the court cited Stolt-Nielsen for the premise that a party cannot be com-
pelled into class arbitration where the arbitration agreement is silent with respect
to the issue.98 The court noted that this holding was based on the fact that an arbi-
trator's power is derived from the consent of the parties and that the arbitrator in
that case had no authority to allow a class action because there was no contractual
basis for concluding that the parties had consented to it.99
Applying those principles to the facts at hand, the court recognized that the
arbitration agreement in Brewer's contract was not silent with respect to class
arbitration, as was the agreement in Stolt-Nielsen, but that MTL's case was actual-
ly stronger because it had explicitly withheld consent to class arbitration.'" The
court also determined that if it were to strike only the unconscionable portion, then
the arbitration agreement would be silent with regard to class arbitration, essen-
tially creating a similar situation to the one confronted in Stolt-Nielsen.'0 1 How-
ever, without affirmative consent to class arbitration, as Stolt-Nielsen requires,
MTL could not be compelled to submit to class arbitration. 0 2
The court then turned its attention to the decision of the trial court, which
severed the unconscionable class arbitration waiver from the rest of the agreement
and essentially allowed Brewer to force MTL into class arbitration.'s The court
stated that, even though this decision was consistent with other Missouri cases,
allowing MTL to be forced into class arbitration was simply not an option because
MTL did not consent to it.1'" They further stated that allowing the rest of the
arbitration agreement to stand was also a problem because Brewer would still be
forced into individual arbitration, as class arbitration was out of the question. 05
However, the court noted that the trial court had already determined that individu-
al arbitration would be unconscionable in this case.'06 The court concluded that if
this finding of unconscionability was correct, the unconscionable aspects of the
contract could not be remedied by severing only the class arbitration waiver be-
cause Brewer could not be forced into individual arbitration and MTL could not
be forced into class arbitration. 107 The court went on to determine whether the
individual arbitration would be unconscionable under these circumstances.
The court first made note of the two types of unconscionability discussed
above. 08 The court pointed to Vincent v. Schneider, a case in which the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that a provision was unconscionable without ever address-
ing procedural unconscionability.' Although the case never explicitly stated that
97. Brewer, 323 S.W,3d at 20.
98. Id.; see also Stoll-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
99. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 20.
100. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 20.





106. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Id.; see also Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006).
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only substantive unconscionability is needed, it supported the conclusion that
Missouri law requires only one type of unconscionability." 10 Thus, according to
Missouri law, unconscionability can be substantive, procedural, or some combina-
tion of the two."'
The court in Brewer suggested that there was a sufficient amount of proce-
dural unconscionability in the arbitration agreement to make it invalid."'2 To
begin with, the terms of the agreement were difficult to understand, they were
offered on a "take it or leave it" basis, and there was no evidence that Brewer had
an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract."3 Furthermore, as in Woods,
Missouri Title Loans was clearly in a superior bargaining position because the
company was doing business with customers in financial distress who were in
such desperate need of funds that they were willing to take out the loans with
incredibly high interest rates."14
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence of substantive uncons-
cionability. 5 Brewer presented three experts who all testified that it would be
nearly impossible for her to secure counsel for this type of claim because the sub-
ject matter is very complicated and requires significant discovery and expertise.'
However, because of the nature of the case and the small damages at issue, it
would be economically impractical for an attorney to take on such a case, espe-
cially when going up against a "heavily defended" opponent such as MTL.1
Citing Woods once again, the court recognized that without the ability to retain
counsel to aid her in navigating such a complicated issue, Brewer would be left
without a meaningful avenue of redress."8 Furthermore, this would allow compa-
nies such as MTL to continue with their unfair business practices by allowing
them to put their customers in so weak a position that they would have no chance
of a remedy." 9
The court upheld the trial court's determination that the class arbitration
waiver was unconscionable.12 However, because the FAA would not allow class
arbitration without Missouri Title Loans' express consent, the court determined
that the only appropriate remedy would be to strike the arbitration agreement alto-
gether and allow the matter to proceed to class litigation.' 2'
B. Judge Price's Dissent
Judge Price began his dissent by recognizing the importance of two compet-
ing goals: the protection of consumers like Brewer and MTL's freedom of con-
110. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 22.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 23.





118. Id.; see also Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 97-99.
119. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 23-24.
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tract.122 Ultimately, his dissent rested on a determination that the class arbitration
waiver was not unconscionable.' 23 He argued that, under Missouri law, evidence
of both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present to invalidate
a contract provision.124 Procedural unconscionability, he stated, is necessary to
demonstrate that both parties have entered the agreement freely.12 He rejected
the idea that Vincent dispensed with the need for both types of unconscionability,
and argued instead that the Vincent court "merely blue-pencilled] the substantive-
ly unconscionable provisions" out of the arbitration agreement, while letting the
remaining agreement stand.126 Judge Price then explained that, in his view, there
was no evidence of procedural unconscionability.127
With regard to procedural unconscionability, he argued that there was no
"high-pressure sales tactics" or coercive behavior on MTL's part, and also noted
that the class arbitration waiver was written in bold capital letters.' 28 While he
recognized that MTL was most likely in a superior bargaining position and that
Brewer was not able to negotiate the terms of the contract, he asserted that this
alone is not enough and that Brewer must have some evidence that she was unable
to find a better contract elsewhere.'29 He urged that the policy behind this idea is
that these "take-it-or-leave-it agreements" are so common in business today that if
we were to invalidate them all merely because one party was in a better bargaining
position, "commerce would screech to a halt."o30 He went on to point out that
Brewer stated that she did not think reading the loan agreement was important,
that she had compiled a list of twenty other similar companies that she could have
gone to, and that there was nothing stopping her from shopping for a loan agree-
ment with more favorable terms.' 3 ' Thus, in Judge Price's opinion, there was no
procedural unconscionability.
Judge Price then went on to find that there was no evidence of substantive
unconscionability.132 The amount at issue in the case was $4,000, which did not
include the interest that continued to accrue while the loan remained unpaid or
other expenses and fees that Brewer might have been able to collect.'3 3 Although
the size of this claim may have made it somewhat less attractive to attorneys,
Judge Price urged that it did not bar Brewer from obtaining an adequate reme-
dy.134
After determining that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable,
Judge Price then addressed the majority's use of Stolt-Nielsen and the contract
122. Id.
123. Id. at 24-25.
124. Id. at 25.
125. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 25.
126. Id. at 26; see also Mid-States Paint & Chem. Co. v. Herr, 746 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Mo. App. E.D.
1988) ("Under the blue pencil doctrine, if a restrictive covenant contains words which are unreasona-
ble limitations and if stricken would have a reasonable contract, the court may 'blue pencil' or strike
those words out . . . .") (citations omitted).
127. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 26 (Price, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 26-27.
130. Id. (quoting Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2009)).
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defense of consent.i35 He urged that Stolt-Nielsen only stands for the concept that
parties cannot be forced into class arbitration when their agreement is silent on the
issue and that it does not prohibit state courts from severing an unwanted portion
from an arbitration agreement while letting the remainder stand.'36  In other
words, individual arbitration would still be permissible even if class arbitration
would not.'37 In fact, Judge Price asserted that if courts follow Stolt-Nielsen, indi-
vidual arbitration is actually the default when an arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue.'38 He stated that it is ultimately a question of the parties' intent, and it is
clear from the evidence in the record that both parties contemplated some form of
arbitration.'39 Thus, he concluded that it was error for the majority to strike the
entire arbitration agreement, rather than merely severing what they believed to be
an unconscionable class arbitration waiver.140
In his last point, Judge Price asserted that class arbitration waivers are enfor-
ceable and cited to cases from Missouri, as well as the Eighth and Third Circuits
to support that proposition.' 4' Furthermore, he noted that Missouri tends to give
preferential treatment to arbitration clauses.142 He urged that, while protection of
consumers is particularly important with respect to the small loan industry, the
benefits of that protection might not outweigh the costs.143 Lenders, such as MTL,
are likely to pass on the additional costs of litigation or class arbitration to their
customers, or even abandon the market entirely.14 He further stated that this type
of balancing with respect to public policy is a job for the legislature.' 45 Thus,
Judge Price concluded that the entire arbitration agreement, including the class
arbitration waiver, should be enforceable.146
V. COMMENT
Brewer represents a departure from past Missouri law in two significant
ways. First, it dispenses with the requirement of showing both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, holding instead that only one or the other is neces-
sary to invalidate a provision. Second, rather than severing only the unconsciona-
ble class arbitration waiver, as was typical of past Missouri cases, the court used
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 27 (Price, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 27-28.
139. Id. at 28.
140. Id.
141. Id; see also Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that a class
arbitration waiver was not unconscionable, despite the fact that the claim was small, because the plain-
tiff had the option of filing her claim individually in a small claims court); Pleasants v. Am. Express
Co., 541 F.3d 853, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a class arbitration waiver was not unconscion-
able where plaintiffs potential recovery exceeded the costs of pursuing the claim individually);
Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 98 (absent public policy to the contrary, "a party may waive the provision of a
contract or statute made for his benefit") (citations and quotations omitted); Gay v. Creditingform, 511
F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a class arbitration waiver was not invalid without some
showing of procedural unconscionability).
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the contract doctrine of consent to invalidate what remained of the arbitration
agreement. While, at their heart, the doctrines of consent and unconscionability
lie in contract, their impact on arbitration agreements has been profound.
The majority relied heavily on Stolt-Nielsen in holding that MTL could not be
forced into class arbitration without its consent. Judge Price's dissent criticized
the majority for mischaracterizing Stolt-Nielsen and for applying it to a case that
was not silent as to class arbitration. While it is true that the contract in Stolt-
Nielsen was silent regarding class arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court supported
the conclusion that when the parties' intentions with respect to class arbitration are
unknown, their consent to such a provision cannot be implied. Furthermore, in the
absence of this consent, the parties cannot be forced to arbitrate any particular
issue, or with any particular party. In Brewer, MTL expressly withheld its consent
to class arbitration, as was its right to do so. Surely the class arbitration waiver
was indicative of MTL's intent to avoid class arbitration, despite its invalidity. To
that extent, the majority's logic is fairly easy to follow.
Given the majority's concern for MTL's lack of consent, it is quite perplexing
that, in the end, the court gave MTL the exact opposite of what they had expected
when entering the contract. Nothing could have been further from what MTL
consented to than class-wide litigation. The court relied on Stolt-Nielsen in hold-
ing that the remaining portion of the arbitration agreement was invalid. Yet this
case is fundamentally different from Stolt-Nielsen because the intentions of the
parties in Brewer were not unknown. To the contrary, the contract was very clear
with regard to the procedures that MTL was willing to endure, and that did not
include class litigation. Thus, by severing the entire arbitration agreement and
putting Brewer in a position to force MTL into class litigation, the court specifi-
cally undermined the very same contract doctrine that it purported to uphold.
Much like the consent analysis, the court's unconscionability analysis is also
flawed. Interestingly, the Brewer court found evidence of both types of uncons-
cionability in the arbitration agreement at issue. Thus, one cannot help but ques-
tion why the court abandoned, not only its own precedent, but also a long-standing
and widely accepted judicial belief that both prongs of unconscionability must be
satisfied to invalidate a provision when it was unnecessary to achieve their desired
end.147 Implicit in this inquiry is the need to examine the policy goals behind both
approaches.
Several years before Brewer, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Swain v. Auto
Services, Inc. suggested that standardized contracts are not inherently unconscion-
able.148 The Swain court stated that because the vast majority of our contracts are
"form contracts," any rule that would automatically invalidate them would prove
to be "completely unworkable." 49 Citing to the Eighth Circuit, Judge Price's
dissent similarly indicated that contracts like the one Brewer entered into are so
commonplace today, that invalidating them without a showing that the agreement
147. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory offUnconscionability: An Empir-
ical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2006) (There is an "overwhelming
judicial belief that evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability is required to sustain
a claim.").
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process was tainted could bring commerce to a halt. 50 Presumably, this is be-
cause businesses will either be entrenched in litigation surrounding existing con-
tracts, or because they will simply abandon what they consider to be risky mar-
kets. However, there are certain benefits with regard to standardized contracts,
including more efficient use of both time and money by consumers and produc-
ers.'5 1 Treating standardized contracts as inherently unconscionable not only de-
prives society of these benefits, but also calls into question many of the numerous
contracts that consumers enter into every day. The result of such a policy would
be the chaos that was contemplated by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Swain.
While procedural unconscionability undoubtedly has its importance, it is
possible that requiring it may not always be equitable. Here, the concern is with
contracts that contain harsh, one-sided terms, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no procedural unfairness in their creation. Should such contracts be given
immunity by a policy that would require both types of unconscionability? The
Brewer court certainly did not seem to think so. As a policy matter, the court also
supports the argument that harsh class arbitration waivers, even where the con-
sumer agrees to them, are unconscionable because they allow businesses to con-
tinue with bad practices.152 However, one cannot escape the observation that,
according to the court, this was not the type of contract with which they were
presented. Thus, one can only assume either that the court did not think the evi-
dence of procedural unconscionability in Brewer's contract was persuasive, 53 or it
was merely making a point to set the precedent for future cases.
The unfortunate result of this shift by the Brewer court is an attitude of judi-
cial paternalism 54 that rewards plaintiffs who fail to do their homework before
signing contracts containing arbitration agreements. Furthermore, it directly un-
dermines the parties' freedom to contract as they see fit and the predictability that
parties contemplate when entering a contract. The entire point of a contract is to
enable parties to know exactly what is expected of them, and what is to happen if
either party falls short of those expectations. Yet the court in Brewer is essentially
telling MTL, and all similar parties, that even if they fulfill every one of their
promises made in the contract, their counterparts need not do the same. This is
the result even if the process by which the contract was entered was entirely even-
handed. Thus, even though MTL seemingly did what was necessary to apprise
Brewer of the class arbitration waiver, the court says she need not comply with it.
In the end, courts are forced to make a choice between two competing goals:
protection of consumers, such as Brewer, and the freedom to contract. While
consumer protection is certainly a worthwhile goal, it simply cannot outweigh the
benefits of requiring evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionabili-
150. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 26-27 (Price, C.J. dissenting) (citing Cicle, 583 F.3d at 555).
151. Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58
EMORY L.J. 1401, 1435-37 (2009) (suggesting that the time and money saved by companies in using
standardized contracts is passed on to consumers through lower product prices).
152. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 23-24.
153. Judge Pricc's dissent refers to Brewer's statements that she did not read the contract before
signing it because she did not feel that it was important and that she compiled a list of at least twenty
other companies she could have contracted with instead of Missouri Title Loans. These are factors that
would undermine a finding ofprocedural unconscionability. See Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 23-24.
154. See Lamploy, supra note 2, at 479 ("In recent years . .. courts have examined the class-waiver
arbitration agreement with increased paternalism on behalf of the consumer").
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ty. MTL had a right to bargain for a class arbitration waiver and Brewer had a
right to not accept it. The courts need to send a message that consumers cannot
blindly enter contracts, as Brewer did, and simply hope for the best. Furthermore,
the burden placed on consumers by this requirement is low because, based on
Missouri's sliding scale approach, the consumer need only show minimal proce-
dural unconscionability if enough substantive unconscionability is present, and
vice versa. Requiring both will allow parties to know what is expected of them
and afford parties the ability to rely comfortably on those expectations.
Nevertheless, the court has unreservedly followed the new framework set
forth in Brewer. Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda55 was a companion case decided
on the same day as Brewer. When Ruhl bought her car from the dealership, she
signed a contract that contained a $199.95 "Dealership Administrative Fee" and a
mandatory arbitration agreement with a class action waiver.1s6 After Ruhl filed a
class action suit to recover the fee, Honda filed a motion to compel individual
arbitration. 57 Following the Brewer logic, and citing to Brewer several times, the
court held that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenfor-
ceable.158 Thus, while the Brewer decision is still new, the court has not given
any indication that they intend to back down on their logic.
VI. CONCLUSION
Brewer exemplifies the clash between competing interests so common .in
consumer contracts today. Perhaps in an effort to strike some balance between the
need to protect consumers and the parties' freedom of contract, the court departed
from both Missouri precedent and also from the widely accepted two-pronged
unconscionability analysis that is so prevalent in most jurisdictions. In doing so,
they have specifically undermined the broad federal policy in favor of arbitration
agreements.' 59 While only time can tell what the true effect of this decision will
be, the Brewer approach is sure to have far-reaching consequences with regard to
class arbitration waivers, as well as other contract provisions.
WHITNEY HAMPTON
155, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2010).
156. Id. at 138.
157, Id.
158. Id at 138-40.
159. Moses H. Conc Mern'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the
FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, not-
withstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.").
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